Moody’s Changes Mali’s Outlook to Negative, Affirms Caa2 Rating
Moody’s Ratings (Moody’s) has changed the outlook on the Government of Mali to negative from stable and has affirmed the local- and foreign-currency long-term issuer ratings at Caa2.
In the rating note, Moody’s said the negative outlook reflects the downside risks stemming from the deterioration in the security situation over the past year, most notably evident in the coordinated, large-scale attacks across the country in April 2026.
Moody’s stated that even though the attacks have been, to date, contained by the Malian armed forces, this trend of intensification of violence and the spread of attacks across the country raise the risk that the transition government loses its effective control over the state, which would further undermine Mali’s debt repayment capacity.
The affirmation of the ratings at Caa2 recognises credit supports such as Mali’s resilient economic outlook, continued fiscal discipline supported by well-established budget management and moderate debt levels, weighed against continued liquidity risks amid severely constrained access to external financing and increasing reliance on the regional debt market.
Concurrently, the local currency (LC) remains unchanged at B3 and the foreign currency (FC) ceiling unchanged at Caa1.
Moody’s said the outlook change to negative reflects the risk that Mali’s fragile political and security situation will continue to deteriorate, potentially leaving the government with limited effective control over the state and raising default risk.
Security challenges have already intensified since 2025, with extremists’ groups attacking essential infrastructure in the capital cutting off fuel supplies since the second half of 2025.
The deterioration of the security situation has been further evidenced by coordinated large-scale attacks in April 2026, involving Tuareg separatists and extremist Jihadist groups. Various cities were attacked simultaneously across the country, notably resulting in the killing of Defense Minister Sadio Camara.
While the Malian armed forces have, to date, contained the attacks, these developments point to increasing fragmentation of the conflict.
Tensions with Tuaregs have reignited following the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping force in 2023 and the termination of the Algiers Accord in 2024, effectively opening a second military front for the authorities alongside the fight against Jihadist groups.
The worsening security environment also points to a likely weakening of external support and suggests a more distant prospect for the return to civilian rule as military objectives take precedence.
The timeline for the return to civilian rule was already in doubt following the cancellation of presidential elections and the dissolution of all political parties in 2025.
“We expect the security situation to remain extremely fragile, increasing the risk that the transition government effectively loses power, for instance through a regime collapse, forced negotiations with extremist groups or disputed control over the territory or institutions.
“Such outcomes could in turn raise default risk, including potentially through disruptions to access to the regional debt market, Mali’s near-sole source of borrowing”, Moody’s said. Despite the fragile political and security situation, the Malian economy has demonstrated its resilience.
Mali registered real GDP growth of 5.6% in 2025 according to the authorities, driven by the strong performance of the primary sector and services which mitigated the negative impact from declining gold production due to disputes with mining companies and from energy supply disruptions.
Over the next three years, we expect growth to remain around 5% annually, balancing growing mining output and the implementation of the authorities’ development plan with the continued negative impact from the security situation.
Prudent management of public finances and moderate debt levels also support Mali’s credit profile. Despite significant pressures on security and defense expenditure and the decline in grants since the military coups, the authorities have managed to contain fiscal deficits, which averaged 2.3% of GDP over 2023-25.
On the revenue side, not only administrative capacities have been broadly maintained since the military coups, but the authorities have also progressed in the implementation of reforms to revenue collection.
Meanwhile, the authorities have reined in spending to accommodate for limited financing options and rising defense spending needs. This has enabled Mali’s debt burden to remain moderate, at 41.8% of GDP in 2025.
The affirmation of the ratings at Caa2 reflects persisting liquidity risks. In the absence of clear roadmap for a return to civilian rule, we expect access to external financing from the official sector, which accounted for the majority of Mali’s debt and financing prior to the military coups, will remain scarce.
Grants have declined to 0.1% of GDP in 2025, from a peak of 3.3% of GDP in 2020, while external financing flows also declined to 0.5% of GDP in 2025, from 3.1% in 2019.
Liquidity pressures are further evidenced by the occurrence of payment arrears on external debt, albeit at low levels (estimated at 0.6% of GDP at end-2025).
Although declining external financing has not impacted the government’s capacity to execute its budget so far, it has led to increasing reliance on the WAEMU regional market for funding.
Ratings analysts expect this trend to continue, resulting in further shortening of maturities and an increase in debt-servicing cost. Rising exposure of Malian and regional banks to the government creates risks over the regional market’s capacity to absorb additional debt.
However, our baseline scenario is that given Mali’s moderate gross financing needs below 10% of GDP and the WAEMU regional central bank’s continued liquidity support to the banking system, local and regional banks will continue to provide sufficient financing to the government. Tinubu Signs N68.32trn 2026 Budget, Extends 2025 Capex
